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Abstract The paper investigates the propriety of applying the form versus mat-
ter distinction to arguments and to logic in general. Its main point is that many of
the currently pervasive views on form and matter with respect to logic rest on sev-
eral substantive and even contentious assumptions which are nevertheless uncritically
accepted. Indeed, many of the issues raised by the application of this distinction to
arguments seem to be related to a questionable combination of different presupposi-
tions and expectations; this holds in particular of the vexed issue of demarcating the
class of logical constants. I begin with a characterization of currently widespread views
on form and matter in logic, which I refer to as ‘logical hylomorphism as we know
it’—LHAWKI, for short—and argue that the hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI is
mereological. Next, I sketch an overview of the historical developments leading from
Aristotelian, non-mereological metaphysical hylomorphism to mereological logical
hylomorphism (LHAWKI). I conclude with a reassessment of the prospects for the
combination of hylomorphism and logic, arguing in particular that LHAWKI is not the
only and certainly not the most suitable version of logical hylomorphism. In particular,
this implies that the project of demarcating the class of logical constants as a means
to define the scope and nature of logic rests on highly problematic assumptions.
Keywords Hylomorphism · Demarcation of logic · Logical constants ·
History of logic
In this paper, I investigate the propriety of applications of the form versus matter dis-
tinction—originally introduced by Aristotle in (meta)physical contexts—to arguments
and to logic in general. The main point I will argue for is that many of the currently
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pervasive views on form and matter regarding logic rest on several substantive and
even contentious assumptions which are nevertheless uncritically accepted. Indeed,
many of the issues raised by the application of this distinction to arguments seem to be
related to a questionable combination of different presuppositions and expectations.
This holds in particular of the vexed issue of demarcating the class of logical constants;
much of the literature of the last decades in the field has been devoted to this topic,
but it remains essentially an open problem.1
In order to understand how and why we came to hold the currently received views
on form and matter in logic, it will prove useful to examine the history of applications
of the distinction to arguments, yielding what could be described as the thesis of ‘log-
ical hylomorphism’ (a term coined by J. MacFarlane).2 Logical hylomorphism as we
know it3—henceforth, LHAWKI—will be discussed in Sect. 1, but for a first approxi-
mation one could say the following: LHAWKI is the doctrine according to which the
form versus matter distinction is to be applied to objects such as arguments4 so as
to outline what is distinctively logical about them—which is associated to their for-
mal aspects—as opposed to their merely material aspects. Thus seen, the form versus
matter distinction has the crucial responsibility of demarcating what is logical from
what is not logical (in particular, of defining the class of logical constants), and of
grounding the validity of valid arguments. In fact, it seems reasonable to say that most
of the currently pervasive conceptions of logic rest fundamentally on the particular
interpretation of the form versus matter distinction underlying LHAWKI. It is usually
in this sense that the slogan ‘logic is formal’ is put forward, that is, in the sense that
logic deals (exclusively) with forms of arguments.
The paper proceeds as follows: Sect 1 presents a characterization of LHAWKI as
based on a mereological5 form of hylomorphism, and suggests that many of the issues
that arise in connection with LHAWKI’s account of the validity of arguments and
of logic in general stem from this particular application of the form versus matter
1 See MacFarlane (2009) for an overview of these discussions as well as a thorough list of references.
Gomez-Torrente (2002), van Benthem (1989) and McCarthy (1981) are particularly worth mentioning.
MacFarlane (2009) classifies the different positions with respect to the problem of logical constants into
four kinds: “the Demarcater, the Debunker, the Deflater, and the Relativist.” He also recognizes that the
issue is unsettled and that “there is little philosophical consensus about the basis for the distinction between
logical and nonlogical expressions”. According to this taxonomy, the views I will be defending here are
probably best described as a belonging to the Debunker camp. As will become clear, I endorse one of
Debunker’s main theses: “logic is concerned with validity simpliciter, not just validity that holds in virtue
of a limited set of ‘logical forms.”’
2 MacFarlane (2000) refers to it as a ‘tradition’ rather than a doctrine, as he correctly notices that there are
different notions of form and matter in play, and thus that logical hylomorphism is not a unified doctrine.
Nevertheless, as here I will be mainly speaking of the (in MacFarlane’s terms) ‘schematic’ notion of formal-
ity, I will be dealing with a specific thesis/doctrine. As such, the term ‘formal’ is quite ambiguous, allowing
for different interpretations, so it is important to bear in mind that here I am concerned with schematic
formality.
3 The qualification ‘as we know it’ is crucial, as it stresses the difference between the form of logical hy-
lomorphism that is now widely (but often tacitly) held and the other forms of logical hylomorphism which
could be articulated taking a different form of hylomorphism as their starting point.
4 In this tradition, there is also considerable interest in the logical form of sentences, but for reasons of
space I shall here focus on arguments.
5 The mereological terminology will be explained in due course.
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distinction to arguments. Section 2 reviews the historical developments that led from
Aristotelian, non-mereological metaphysical hylomorphism to mereological logical
hylomorphism, LHAWKI. The significance of this historical overview is to show that
the particular view on the validity of arguments as related to their form (on a specific
understanding of ‘form’) is the product of a historical (contingent) course of events,
and thus not necessarily constitutive of logic as such. Finally, in Sect. 3 I briefly dis-
cuss the prospects for the combination of hylomorphism and logic. I argue that there
seem to be at least three reasonable options: to let go of hylomorphism entirely with
respect to logic; to hold an analogical/metaphorical interpretation of hylomorphism
in logic; to take a different version of metaphysical hylomorphism as a starting point,
for instance the non-mereological functionalist hylomorphism formulated by Aristotle
himself.6 At any rate, I conclude that LHAWKI is best abandoned, unless it is able to
give a satisfactory answer to the key issues it seems to be neglecting.
1 Logical hylomorphism as we know it
Although the thesis that logic is formal is often seen as the traditional, millennia-old
account of what is distinctive about logic, MacFarlane’s (2000) historical analysis
convincingly shows that this is not the case; according to him, it was Kant who first
offered a worked-out view of formality as a criterion for logicality.7 Before Kant,
logic was thought to deal with forms of arguments, to be sure, but not exclusively with
forms of arguments. At the same time, the very distinction between the formal and
the material aspects of arguments had been available for most of the post-Aristotelian
logical tradition broadly construed (ranging from the Ancient Commentators to Scho-
lasticism). The turning point introduced by Kant was to use the form versus matter
distinction as a criterion for what is to count as logic.8 We shall look into these his-
torical developments in Sect. 2, but first let me offer a characterization of what could
be called the classical or ‘textbook’ view of logic, outlining how crucially it relies on
LHAWKI and thus on a particular interpretation of the form versus matter distinction
as a demarcating criterion.
In an attempt to circumvent the risk of building a straw-man when characterizing
the classical view, let me rely on one of the best introductions to the philosophy of
logic available, namely S. Read’s Thinking about Logic (1995). It is in the chapter on
logical consequence that Read spells out in detail (and then goes on to criticize) the
6 Indeed, the form of hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI is significantly different from Aristotle’s own
hylomorphism, even though the latter is clearly the indirect historical source of the former. Describing the
different stages of this transformation is one of the purposes of the present contribution.
7 But what Kant means by ‘formal’ is not exactly what is now typically meant when it is said that logic
is formal (although traces of Kantian idealism are still to be found in current conceptions of logic, e.g. the
idea that logic is completely divorced from the empirical world). This is significant, as it implies that the
criticism being developed here does not extend to a Kantian demarcational project such as MacFarlane’s
(even though I believe that there are equally serious problems with the Kantian approach).
8 Although Kant usually speaks of the form versus content opposition rather than the form versus matter
opposition, in particular in the first Critique.
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extent to which the classical view is intertwined with a particular application of the
form versus matter distinction to arguments.9
Speaking very generally, we could say that one of the goals of logic is to establish
effective methods to differentiate valid from invalid arguments in a systematic way;
after all, once one is in possession of such a method, one can adjudicate for arguments
in general whether they are valid, and in particular whether knowledge of the premises
entitles one to knowledge of the conclusion. Now, the form versus matter distinction
as applied to arguments promises to deliver just that. The basic idea is that, in an argu-
ment, there is something that corresponds to its form and something that corresponds
to its matter; moreover, the validity of an argument is viewed as a property exclusively
related to its form.
First, on the classical view, validity is a matter of form. Individual arguments are
valid only in virtue of instantiating valid logical forms; one proposition is a log-
ical consequence of others only if there is a valid pattern which the propositions
together match. (Read 1995, 36)
So on this view, the form of an argument is precisely that in virtue of which it is
valid. There is a class of argument-forms which are deemed to generate valid argu-
ments, and the validity of a particular argument depends solely on its displaying one
of these forms: nothing else is either required or allowed to ground the validity of an
argument. Thus seen, it seems natural that logic must deal exclusively with forms, if
it is to be a method to distinguish valid from invalid arguments.
So validity is a matter of form, and the task of logic is to provide techniques
for identifying and discerning the logical form of various arguments, and for
determining whether the forms discovered in this way are indeed valid. (Read
1995, 37)
One could of course wonder what exactly is being captured by means of the focus
on forms. How does one establish that a given argument-form yields valid arguments
in the first place? In fact, the first question to be asked is: what is so special about valid
arguments anyway? A few lines above I have already hinted at what is at stake when
I said that, in a valid argument, knowledge of the premises entitles one to knowledge of
the conclusion. The point is of course that a valid argument is expected to expand our
initial state of knowledge: if things are as described by the premises, then surely they
are also as described by the conclusion (provided that the argument is valid). Hence,
on the basis of a valid argument, we come to know more about whatever objects the
argument is about. For this to occur, valid arguments must be truth-preserving, and
valid forms are those whose instantiations are all truth-preserving.
According to the classical account, [the criterion of validity for arguments and
argument-forms] is truth preservation. That is, an argument-form is valid if,
9 As described here, the classical view is essentially a portrait of MacFarlane’s Demarcater, but a Relativist
and a Deflater may also be partisans of the classical view if they hold that logic deals exclusively with forms
of arguments and with formal validity.
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however the schematic letters are interpreted, the result does not consist of a
collection of true premises and a false conclusion. (Read 1995, 37)
There is an apparent tension between the somewhat conflicting ideas of arguments
being valid solely in virtue of their form as opposed to their being valid in virtue
of the property of truth-preservation.10 This tension is diagnosed by Etchemendy
(1990) in terms of two competing notions of logical consequence: in his terminol-
ogy, the representational notion—truth-preservation under modal variation—and the
interpretational notion—validity ensured by the form of an argument, a form which
can generate several substitutional instances. What is then the ultimate ground for the
validity of an argument, form or truth-preservation?
A sensible solution to this tension follows the general idea of reflective equilib-
rium as first described by Goodman (1955, 64).11 The idea is that we intuitively
subscribe to a class of arguments as being valid, roughly those that clearly guaran-
tee truth-preservation; the task of logic is then to capture patterns among these valid
arguments so as to facilitate the recognition of the validity or invalidity of other argu-
ments, i.e. those which are neither obviously valid nor obviously invalid. On this
picture, whenever the (logical) theory deems an intuitively invalid argument as valid,
or the converse, adjustments are required: either the theory needs to be changed, or the
original intuitions must be corrected (whence reflective equilibrium). Thus seen, truth-
preservation and formal validity need not be in tension with one another—they are in
fact two sides of the same coin; it is possible to capture and ensure truth-preservation
by means of (exclusive) focus on forms on a theoretical level.
But what exactly is the form of an argument?12 How do we obtain the separation
of form from matter, given a particular argument? This is indeed the Achilles’ heel of
the whole account, as we shall see. The general procedure is the following:
First, note that as presently outlined, truth-preservation is essentially a substi-
tutional criterion. We take an argument, M. We replace a certain amount of
terminology in M by schematic letters, to obtain an argument-form, M′. We then
interpret the schematic letters in M′ in various ways, looking to see whether any
instance of M′ has true premises and false conclusion. (Read 1995, 40)
If we encounter one instance of M′ which is clearly invalid (true premises but false
conclusion), then we can deem M′ to be an invalid argument-form. A valid argument-
form must yield nothing but instances satisfying the truth-preservation criterion. This
of course does not mean that every instance of M′ (the invalid argument-form) will
have true premises and a false conclusion; but an instance of M′ having either false
10 On the classical account, truth-preservation is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for (formal) validity.
11 The term ‘reflective equilibrium’ itself was introduced only later on, by Rawls (1971).
12 This question can also be seen as pertaining to the metaphysical status of the forms of arguments. What
kind of entities are they? Is there one unique form for each argument? How is the form of an argument
related to its grammatical structure? The metaphysics of arguments and forms of arguments tends to receive
scarce attention in the literature, and this is precisely one of the shortcomings of LHAWKI.
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premises or a true conclusion is not going to be a valid argument, as it is not valid in
virtue of its form.13
Thus seen, the form versus matter distinction applied to arguments relies crucially
on a partition of the vocabulary: some of the terms of an argument are thought to
pertain to its form, while others are thought to pertain to its matter. Those that are
replaced by schematic letters pertain to its matter, and those that are allowed to remain
fixed pertain to its form. Naturally, besides the partition of the vocabulary, the partic-
ular disposition of the terms pertaining to the form of an argument is also constitutive
of this form. Otherwise, arguments having the same terms that remain fixed but in a
different configuration would have the same form, which is of course not what the
LHAWKI tradition holds to be the case.14
Even though those who tacitly accept LHAWKI hardly ever discuss the exact meta-
physical status of the form and matter of arguments thus described, if pressed they
might say something like this: the form of an argument corresponds to (or is rep-
resented by) the schema generated by the uniform substitution of some of its terms
by schematic letters, and its matter corresponds to the terms having been replaced.15
Thus, some structural information also belongs to the form of an argument, but the
truly thorny issue is how to demarcate the terminology in M to be replaced from the
terminology which is to remain fixed in order to separate the form from the matter of
an argument. If the point is to offer a principled criterion for this partition (as it should
be, if the partition is intended to be the means by which logic is demarcated from other
disciplines), then the endeavor is everything but straightforward, as spelled out in the
following passage:
This raises an immediate problem, of course: which substitutions are permissible
– that is, which terms may be replaced? For the classical account does not permit
every term in an argument to be open to substitution. This restriction is contained
within the notion of form, of which we have perhaps said too little. Note that in all
the forms above [examples omitted], one word was not replaced by a schematic
letter, namely, the word ‘all’. This is, on the classical conception (and indeed all
others) a reserved term, part of the logical vocabulary. In exhibiting the logical
form of an argument, we replace all expressions other than those in the logical
vocabulary by schematic letters. Logical words include ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘if’, ‘and’,
‘or’, ‘not’, and a number of others. Indeed, some words are treated sometimes as
logical, sometimes not, yielding different logics. For example, if ‘necessarily’ is
treated as a logical word, we obtain modal logic, an extension of classical logic;
13 Etchemendy (1990, 2008) claims that the view according to which truth-preservation in all substitu-
tional instances is the proper criterion of validity for arguments and argument-schemata makes the mistake
of “confusing the symptoms of logical consequence with their cause” (Etchemendy 2008, 264). The idea is
that, if what is required to establish whether a given argument is valid is that all its substitutional instances
be truth-preserving, then one is already required to know whether this particular argument (being one
of its substitutional instances) is valid, which is precisely what one seeks to establish. For Etchemendy,
truth-preservation is a symptom (consequence) of validity, not its cause.
14 Obviously, ‘Not every man is an animal’ and ‘Every dog is not a stone’ share the same logical terminology
but not the same logical form.
15 John Corcoran is one of the few to have inquired into the metaphysics of schemata—see Corcoran
(2008).
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if not, non-modal, that is, standard logic. If the ‘is’ of identity […] is taken as a
logical term, we obtain classical logic with identity, if not, not. Many extensions
of classical logic (so themselves essentially classical) are obtained by extending
the logical vocabulary. (Read 1995, 40/41)
Thus seen, it is clear that, from this point of view, the logical versus non-logical
distinction neatly corresponds to the form versus matter distinction (on a particular
interpretation of it). The assumption warranting this correspondence is that logic deals
exclusively with forms, namely forms of arguments, and thus that to be logical and
to be formal are equivalent notions. The form of an argument corresponds to a par-
ticular subset of its lexicon in a particular disposition, and precisely this subset is
thought to correspond to the logical constants being used in the argument. All the rest
is material—or equivalently, non-logical.
In his ‘On the concept of following logically’ (1936/2002), which is a locus
classicus for the (recent) development of the standard views I am portraying here,
Tarski recognizes that the logical versus non-logical partition is the cornerstone of his
account: “At the foundation of our whole construction lies the division of all terms
of a language into logical and extra-logical” (Tarski 1936/2002, 188). But the article
ends with Tarski revealing his own skepticism on the prospects for such a partition:
[3.3 Prospects] [3.3.1] Clearly, further investigations may throw a lot of light
on the question which interests us; perhaps one will succeed with the help of
some weighty arguments of an objective character in justifying the dividing line
traced by tradition between logical and extra-logical terms. [3.3.2] Personally
I would not be surprised however even if the result of these investigations were
to be decidedly negative and if hence it would turn out to be necessary to treat
such concepts as following logically, analytic sentence or tautology as relative
concepts which must be related to a definite but more or less arbitrary division
of the terms of a language into logical and extra-logical […]. (Tarski 1936/2002,
189)
A few decades later, Tarski returned to this issue, but this time more optimistic about
the prospects of formulating a principled criterion for the distinction between logical
and non-logical terms (or more generally, notions, which are for Tarski non-linguis-
tic objects). In a 1966 lecture (published posthumously in 1986), Tarski proposed a
version of the notion of permutation invariance as a criterion for a principled distinc-
tion.16 On this account, truth-functional connectives, quantifiers and binary relations
such as identity and diversity are ruled-in as logical, which is prima facie a desirable
result. Indeed, permutation invariance (under different formulations) is still widely
viewed as possibly the best candidate for a principled criterion for logicality.17 But
it does not seem to do justice to many of the important developments in logic of
the last decades, ruling out as non-logical many terms and notions that we would be
prepared to call logical (at least within a given logic). For example, if interpreted on
Kripke-frames, modal notions would be permutation-invariant (and thus logical) only
16 Simons (1992) offers an illuminating account of Tarski’s transformation from Skeptic to Demarcater.
17 See in particular the work of G. Sher and of D. Bonnay.
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if interpreted on: (i) frames where every possible world is related to every possible
world, (ii) frames with empty accessibility relation, or (iii) frames with only the reflex-
ive accessibility relation.18 But this is an awkward implication, to say the least: why
should a necessity-box operator be logical in such frames, while its S4 counterpart
is not? The permutation-invariance criterion also seems to rule-in as logical notions
whose logical status is debatable, in particular numerical relations.19
The debate is at this point inconclusive; none of the principled criteria that have
been proposed so far to justify the logical versus non-logical distinction have met with
unanimous acceptance, but at the same time quite a few people still believe in the
possibility (or in any case in the crucial importance) of ever encountering such a prin-
cipled criterion.20 Indeed, failure to offer a proper treatment of this issue is obviously
a major obstacle for a satisfactory philosophical account of logic based on the form
versus matter distinction along the lines of LHAWKI. Of course, we cannot at this
point exclude the possibility of ever finding such a principled distinction, but given
all the efforts that have already been devoted to this endeavor, it seems to me that
the prospects are quite meager. More importantly, the need for a principled criterion
seems to emerge from an uncritical application of the form versus matter distinction to
arguments and from the attribution of a demarcational (as opposed to merely practical)
function to this distinction. Now, if under closer scrutiny it becomes apparent that some
of the underlying assumptions are unwarranted, one may feel tempted to conclude (as
I do) that the quest for a principled partition of logical from nonlogical expressions is
a misguided enterprise.
So let me spell out in more detail the assumptions being made. Lest the reader
should still think I am describing a straw-man, here is a passage from a renowned
logic textbook, Gamut’s Logic, Language and Meaning vol. 1, where the LHAWKI
ideology is clearly presented:
We say that (1), (7) and (8) [examples of arguments previously given] have a
particular form in common, and that it is this form which is responsible for their
18 The idea (proposed in van Benthem 1989, and further discussed in MacFarlane 2000) is to add worlds
to the primitive set of types (along with objects and propositions) and to require that logical notions be
invariant under the permutation of worlds as well, not only of objects.
19 So a quantifier such as ‘there are exactly two things’ is ruled-in as logical, even though for there to be
two things (in a given domain) seems to be a substantive, non-logical fact. In Etchemendy’s terms, one
could say that the permutation-invariance criterion seems both to undergenerate and to overgenerate with
respect to what one may be prepared to consider a logical constant on intuitive grounds. Interestingly, the
fact that the permutation invariance criterion is mainly sensitive to cardinality and quantities had already
been noticed by Tarski himself: “it turns out that our logic is even less than a logic of extension, it is a
logic of number, of numerical relations” (Tarski 1966/1986, 151). So it seems that the idea of permutation
invariance as a criterion for logicality rests on the contentious assumption that logic is fundamentally about
numbers and quantities.
20 Such as Sher (2008), Feferman (1999) and Bonnay (2008). MacFarlane, for example, argues that “the
permutation invariance criterion does not deliver what it promises” (2000, 175), but then proposes a differ-
ent, equally principled criterion for the demarcation of logic, based on his notion of 1-formality. MacFarlane
sees permutation invariance as a necessary though not sufficient criterion for logicality.
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validity. This common form may be represented schematically like this:




These schematic representations are called argument schemata. The letters A
and B stand for arbitrary sentences. Filling in actual sentences for them, we
obtain an actual argument. Any such substitution into schema (11) results in a
valid argument, which is why (11) is said to be a valid argument schema. (Gamut
1991, 3)
A little further:
Logic, as the science of reasoning, investigates the validity of arguments by
investigating the validity of schemata. For argument schemata are abstractions
which remove all those elements of concrete arguments which have no bearing
on their validity. (Gamut 1991, 4)
Such claims can be found in virtually every introductory textbook to logic,21 and
are thus the kind of ‘philosophical’ account of logic that a student is most likely to
encounter in her/his first contact with logic. Now, as is well known from studies in the
sociology of science, introductory textbooks are extremely powerful in establishing
and disseminating scientific ideology. Once such beliefs settle in at an early stage of
a student’s intellectual development, they tend to become extremely entrenched and
are often subsequently uncritically accepted as truisms; indeed, this seems to be the
case of LHAWKI, which is (tacitly but widely) presupposed in much of our views and
beliefs about logic.
So here is a summary of the main tenets of the LHAWKI position:
1. In every argument, there is something that corresponds to its form and something
that corresponds to its matter.
2. The form of an argument is related to22 a proper subset of the set of its vocabulary,
in a given disposition; the matter of an argument is related to the complement set
of the subset corresponding to its form.
3. The form of an argument can be rendered by means of a schema.
4. The form of a valid argument is that in virtue of which it is valid.
5. Given that logic is the systematic study of the validity of arguments, it is essen-
tially concerned with forms of arguments.
21 By taking these passages from Gamut I do not wish to imply that this textbook is defective or ‘worse’
than others, much to the contrary; the point is precisely that the authors of Gamut express this ideology
more clearly than most other textbooks.
22 I use ‘is related to’ rather than stronger alternatives such as ‘is determined by’ in order to make my
description of LHAWKI as general as possible. However, I suspect that the stronger alternatives are actu-
ally what most people have in mind.
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6. Substitutivity is the technique suitable for this systematic study; the terms of
an argument pertaining to its matter are substituted to generate instances of an
argument-form, while the terms pertaining to its form are allowed to remain fixed.
7. The terms that are allowed to remain fixed (those that pertain to its form) are the
logical terms of an argument—also known as logical constants, precisely because
they remain fixed—while the terms that undergo variation (which pertain to its
matter) are the extra-logical terms of an argument.
8. Logic as a discipline can be demarcated by means of a demarcation of the class
of logical constants, given that logic is the study of argument-forms and thus has
logical constants as its objects of study.
These are some of the assumptions that seem to underlie strong claims such as:
[T]here is little philosophical consensus about the basis for the distinction
between logical and nonlogical expressions. Until this question is resolved, we
lack a proper understanding of the scope and nature of logic, and of the sig-
nificance of the distinction between the “formal” properties and relations logic
studies and related but non-formal ones. (MacFarlane 2009, Introduction)
Why is it that only through the distinction between logical and nonlogical expres-
sions can we attain a proper understanding of logic? Couldn’t there be other approaches
towards a philosophical account of logic? It would seem that such claims are only justi-
fied if theses 1–8 are fully endorsed; rejecting any of them might open up the possibility
for an alternative philosophical account of logic.
Clearly, the doctrines of LHAWKI are based on the presumed propriety of apply-
ing the (originally metaphysical) distinction between form and matter to arguments.
However, an analysis of the metaphysics of arguments, which would be required to
warrant this assumption, is usually not forthcoming. For starters, when speaking of
arguments, what kind of entities are we dealing with exactly? There are quite a few
possibilities, such as: argument-types, argument-tokens (both linguistic entities), argu-
ments as mental constructs, arguments as (platonic) abstract entities. Presumably, the
ontological status of the form of an argument will be related to the ontological status
of an argument itself. Given that LHAWKI typically does not offer an account of the
metaphysics of arguments, one may be inclined to offer one on its behalf, and it seems
to me that, within this tradition, argument-types are typically viewed as the objects to
which the considerations spelled out above apply.
By that as it may, if my characterization of LHAWKI by means of theses 1–8
is correct, then a few considerations on the metaphysical assumptions being made
concerning the form versus matter distinction suggest themselves.
(I) The version of hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI is what can be described
as a mereological hylomorphism, according to the following definition of
mereological hylomorphism: “any account which not only views wholes as
compounds of matter (hule) and form (morphe), but which also takes both of
these components (and, in particular, form) to be themselves parts, strictly
and literally speaking, of the whole they compose” (Koslicki 2006, 717).
Non-mereological hylomorphism is in turn a hylomorphic account of entities
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(wholes) according to which form is not a part of the whole.23 Insofar as
arguments (or argument-types) can be seen as wholes, it would seem that
LHAWKI views the forms of arguments as constitutive parts thereof, given
that the form of an argument is partially determined by a subset of its vocabu-
lary. Mereological hylomorphism does not require that form and matter have
the same ontological status in order for both to constitute parts of the whole24;
so the fact that, according to LHAWKI, logical constants have a special status
does not qualify it as non-mereological. Moreover, the fact that the form of an
argument also contains some structural information related to the disposition
of the terms does not invalidate the observation that the form of an argument
seems to be a constitutive part of the whole. That a (strict) partition of the
vocabulary is a necessary (though not sufficient) element to determine the
form of an argument is, or so it seems to me, sufficient to justify the claim that
the hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI is mereological. (This is particularly
conspicuous in theses 2, 3 and 6.)
(II) The partition between the form and the matter of an argument is meant to be
unique; equivalently, there is one single form per argument. Of course, in prac-
tice this is not always taken very seriously; it is sometimes more convenient
to represent an argument taking the sentences involved as its basic constitu-
ents (and to analyze it by means of propositional logic, for instance), while at
other times it is necessary to spell out the internal structure of the sentences
(outlining their predicates, modal terms etc.). But if the form of an argument
is that in virtue of which it is valid, and validity is understood in an absolute
sense (i.e. not as system-relative), then the implication seems to be that there
is exactly one real, actual form per argument, even if different schemata can
be seen as (more or less) adequate approximations of it. (This is particularly
conspicuous in theses 4, 6 and 7.)
(III) The partition between the form and the matter of an argument is meant to be
principled and sharp. Presumably, there is a fundamental, essential difference
between form and matter, generally speaking, and thus between the form and
matter of arguments in particular; a partition between these two constituents
of an argument should reflect the factual, ontic distinction really present in it.
That there is a factual basis for the distinction is presupposed in the claim that
arguments are valid in virtue of their form and in the idea that a demarcation
of the class of logical constants is to yield an adequate demarcation of logic
as a discipline. (This is particularly conspicuous in theses 4, 5, 7 and 8.)
In short, the version of hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI seems to be commit-
ted to a mereological account of the form-matter compound, to uniqueness of form
in each argument and to an essential, factual distinction between form and matter of
arguments. Of course, many have found some of these assumptions to be unpalatable.
23 Here, I make no use of (or commitment to) other mereological properties of parts and wholes recognized
in the literature; my use of the mereological apparatus is rather minimal, and is restricted to what is spelled
out in this definition.
24 Even in Koslicki’s account of Aristotle’s hylomorphism as mereological, form and matter do not have
the same ontological status even though they are both, strictly speaking, parts of the mereological whole.
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Etchemendy, for example, has criticized the idea of uniqueness of logical form; others
have questioned the need for a principled criterion separating logical from extra-logical
expressions. Indeed, one can adopt a pragmatist view of the distinction (as discussed
in Prior 1976, Wagner 1987 and Warmbrod 1999), according to which the criteria for
such a distinction are directly related to the task(s) at hand, i.e. the particular applica-
tion(s) that the logical system thus formed is to have. On the pragmatist view, there is
no principled, absolute distinction between the form and the matter of an argument;
the distinction is stipulated relative to a particular task.25 If the goal is to study the
logic of modal notions, then modal terms are to be treated as logical constants; if the
goal is to investigate epistemic or deontic notions, then epistemic or deontic terms are
to be treated as logical constants; and so on and so forth.26
But of course, those seeking a principled criterion—in particular, those who think
that a great deal is at stake, most importantly a characterization and demarcation of
logic as a discipline—cannot be satisfied with this approach; they will require further
arguments if they are to be convinced that they should abandon the quest for a prin-
cipled distinction altogether. Indeed, one of the purposes of the present discussion is
precisely to prompt a reflection on the assumptions that underscore the view that a
proper understanding of the scope and nature of logic hinges entirely on the possi-
bility of finding a principled demarcation for the class of logical constants. If these
assumptions turn out to be unwarranted, then this particular philosophical approach
to logic may turn out to be misguided after all.
2 The history of logical hylomorphism as we know it
In this section, I sketch the history of applications of the form versus matter distinc-
tion to arguments. The idea is to suggest that the particular view on the validity of
arguments as related to their form as well as the view that the scope and nature of
logic is determined on the basis of the form versus matter distinction are products of a
historical (contingent) course of events, and thus not necessarily constitutive of logic
as a discipline. The crucial steps in this development were: (1) viewing arguments
as objects to which the form versus matter distinction could legitimately be applied;
(2) establishing the distinction between the form and the matter of arguments on the
basis of a (strict) partition of the vocabulary, yielding mereological logical hylomor-
phism; (3) using the distinction between the form and the matter of arguments as a
means to characterize the very scope and nature of logic.
Contrary to what one might expect, the first applications of the form versus mat-
ter distinction to logic, and more specifically to arguments, are not to be found in
Aristotle, as J. MacFarlane remarks: “Surprisingly, the father of both formal logic
25 This roughly corresponds to MacFarlane’s Relativist. But notice that a pragmatic approach to the issue
of logical constants need not imply logical pluralism or system-relativism: if one thinks that there is one
quintessential task that logic must fulfill (as seems to be the case of Warmbrod, for example), then one may
want to maintain that there is a unique set of logical constants that best suits the job in question, but that
the criterion is purely pragmatic.
26 This is generally the attitude of practicing logicians; finding a principled demarcation for logic tends to
be a worry for the philosopher of logic rather than for the logician.
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and hylomorphism was not the father of logical hylomorphism”27 (MacFarlane 2000,
255). Indeed, one might expect that Aristotle himself would have applied the form
versus matter distinction to logic and logical objects on the basis of the observation
that he is both the first ‘formal logician’ and the first to develop and apply exten-
sively the form versus matter distinction in other domains such as biology, physics
and metaphysics. However, nowhere in the Organon does Aristotle apply the dis-
tinction to logical objects such as arguments or sentences. In fact, he applies the
form-matter distinction to arguments only twice, in the Metaphysics 1013b19–20 and
in an almost identical passage in the Physics 195a18–19. There he observes, without
much elaboration (in the context of a discussion of the four causes) that the premises
are matter for the conclusion (of an argument), “in the sense of ‘that from which”’
(which is a familiar formulation for the notion of material cause). But clearly, this
observation does not in any way anticipate the doctrines underlying LHAWKI. And
yet, it is undoubtedly the Aristotelian form-matter dichotomy (as opposed to, for
instance, Plato’s notion of Forms) that is the indirect historical source of these doc-
trines.
Upon closer inspection, however, it is not so surprising that Aristotle was not the
‘father’ of logical hylomorphism, and more specifically of logical hylomorphism as
we know it—LHAWKI. Firstly, Aristotle did not apply the form versus matter dis-
tinction indiscriminately; for him, only special kinds of entities displayed a hylomor-
phic structure, in particular primary substances. Linguistic objects such as arguments
would not straightforwardly qualify to be described as compounds of form and mat-
ter. Secondly, Aristotle’s own metaphysical hylomorphism appears to be essentially
non-mereological: form is not a part, strictly speaking, of the whole. Rather, form is
the principle of unity28 articulating the different parts of the whole, which constitute
its matter.29 Thus, even if Aristotle had applied the form versus matter distinction to
arguments, most likely the result would have been some form of non-mereological
logical hylomorphism, and thus not mereological LHAWKI.
The first step in the radical transformation from Aristotelian non-mereological,
metaphysical hylomorphism to mereological LHAWKI took place in the tradition
of the later Greek Antiquity, also known as the tradition of the Ancient Commenta-
tors, ranging from the second century A.D. to the sixth century A.D. (roughly, from
Alexander of Aphrodisias to Ammonius and Boethius). In this tradition, applications
of the form versus matter distinction to arguments (syllogisms in particular) are very
pervasive, and the two main loci for this application are commentaries on the Prior
27 MacFarlane immediately adds in a footnote that it might be “no accident that Aristotle refrains from
applying his hylomorphic concepts to logic”, relying on M. Burnyeat’s claim that Aristotle viewed logic as
(strictly) separated from metaphysics and physics.
28
“A principle of unity for a given item is a relation holding of some other items, such that (origins aside)
what it is for the given item to be is for the relation to hold among these items” (Johnston 2006, 653).
29 It is true that a mereological reading of Aristotle’s own account of hylomorphism has its proponents
(Koslicki 2006), but on this matter I side with the more mainstream reading of Aristotle as developing a
non-mereological hylomorphism. Koslicki offers compelling arguments for her view, but overall the case
for a non-mereological interpretation of Aristotle’s hylomorphism seems to me to be stronger.
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Analytics and on the Sophistical Refutations, thus primarily concerning arguments
(syllogisms).30
In Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on the Prior Analytics, one finds the
oldest still extant applications of the form-matter distinction to arguments.31 Here is
an exemplary passage:
The [syllogistic] figures are like a sort of common matrix: by fitting matter into
them, it is possible to mould the same form in different sorts of matters. For just
as things fitted into one and the same matrix differ not in form and figure but
in matter, so it is with the syllogistic figures. (Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Apr
6.16–21, translation p. 48)
Two points are particularly worth noticing in this passage: the mould analogy, and
the attribution of the status of form to syllogistic figures.32 It is well known that Aris-
totle uses the mould analogy to clarify the form-matter distinction quite frequently; he
says for example that the form of a statue is the shape it receives from the mould, while
its matter is the brass out of which it is made.33 Thus, starting from Aristotle’s own
analogy (which induces the notion of form as shape or spatial structure), Alexander (or
30 One may speculate that a preliminary step towards viewing arguments as objects to which the form
versus matter distinction could legitimately be applied was the different status accorded to logical objects
such as arguments by the Stoics. (I owe this point to Arianna Betti.) The Stoics conferred a special place
in their ontology to linguistic objects, which they referred to as lekta; thus, one could say that the Stoics
had a ‘reified’ view of arguments which Aristotle did not share. The Ancient Commentators may have been
influenced by the Stoic reification of arguments in their applications of the form versus matter distinction
to such objects. But at this point, this is no more than speculation, and significantly more historical work
would have to be done in order to corroborate this hypothesis. Also, it is worth noticing that the different
Commentators did not make a uniform use of these concepts and of the accompanying terminology with
respect to logic; in effect, there was not one unique, quintessential logical application of the form-matter
distinction (see Barnes 1990, 41; see also Barnes 2007, Chap. 4) as there seems to be one now (the standard
view described above).
31 Some scholars think that such an application was probably not Alexander’s own innovation, as he “does
not give the impression that he is using a terminology of his own invention” (Ebbesen 1981a, 95). But to my
mind the evidence is inconclusive either way, and Alexander may just as well have been the first to apply
the form versus matter distinction to arguments.
32 Let me just refresh the reader’s memory on some of the details of syllogistic. Aristotle starts with four
classes of categorical sentences: universal affirmatives (A), particular affirmatives (I), universal negatives
(E) and particular negatives (O). The figures (Aristotle explicitly recognizes three of them, but a fourth one
was often considered as well already in the Middle Ages) correspond to the four possible combinations
of the three terms composing a syllogism (the two extremes and the middle term) in each of its three
sentences. Finally, placing the four kinds of categorical sentences into the four figures yields the different
moods—combinatorially, there are 256 possible combinations of sentences, and thus 256 different moods.
Of these, 24 are thought to yield valid arguments; see Lagerlund (2004, Sect. 1).
33 See for example Metaphysics VII-8. But Aristotle’s uses of artifact examples in order to clarify this
distinction are misleading in that they suggest a notion of form (and accordingly, of matter) that is ulti-
mately ineffective when applied to the actually important cases (most notably living beings). As argued
by Cohen (1992, 58), “the problem with the artifact model is that it oversimplifies hylomorphism and ulti-
mately misrepresents it in the cases that are most important to Aristotle.” Given that the artifact analogy
appears to have been the starting point for the application of the form-matter distinction to arguments by the
Ancient Commentators, and given that it arguably misrepresents the gist of Aristotle’s own metaphysical
hylomorphism, it is clear that, from the start, this form of logical hylomorphism already parted significantly
with Aristotle’s version of hylomorphism.
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whoever else before him) may have come to the idea of a similar analogy regarding the
syllogistic figures.34 Indeed, the generation of different specific syllogistic arguments
by means of variation of terms while following the same pattern (the same figure) bears
some resemblance to the process of using a mould to obtain different statues from dif-
ferent portions of matter. The idea is that different syllogistic arguments belonging to
the same figure are different from each other in the same way that statues made with
the same mould are different from each other.
Moreover, Aristotle’s consistent use of schematic letters as place-holders in both
Analytics clearly suggests that what undergoes variation are the terms that are replaced
by the schematic letters. By the same token, what remains the same are the terms
that determine the different moods—what we now refer to as quantifying and negat-
ing terms—and the general term of connection ‘belongs to’ (and of course word
order), thus playing the role of mould. Alexander also comments on Aristotle’s use of
schematic letters, and clearly relates what takes the place of the schematic letters to
the matter of arguments:
He uses letters in his exposition in order to indicate to us that the conclusions do
not depend on the matter but on the figure, on the conjunction of the premises and
on the moods. For so-and-so is deduced syllogistically not because the matter is
of such-and-such a kind but because the combination is so-and-so. The letters,
then, show that the conclusion will be such-and-such universally, always, and
for every assumption. (Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Apr 53.28–54.2, translation
p. 116)
Alexander does not explicitly say (here) what, in a syllogism, corresponds to its
form, but by relating the use of schematic letters in the Aristotelian argument-schemata
to indifference to specific matter, it is but a small step to conclude that the matter of
the argument is referred to or simply is what is replaced by the schematic letters (the
terms), while its form corresponds to the remaining terms. However, the remaining
terms determine not the figure but rather the mood of a syllogism. Hence, while the
Ancient Commentators usually say that the figure of a syllogism, not its mood, cor-
responds to its form, associations of the form versus matter distinction to the use of
schematic letters seem to suggest that the mood of a syllogism, not its figure, would
correspond to its form (more on this below). In other words, a certain ambiguity on
how the form of a syllogism is to be understood is already present in these early texts.
In a similar passage, Alexander stresses that preservation of validity under different
‘material instances’ is precisely what makes syllogistic arguments reliable.
Combinations are called syllogistic and reliable if they do not alter together with
differences in the matter – i.e. if they do not deduce and prove different things at
different times, but always and in every material instance preserve one and the
same form in the conclusion. Combinations which change and alter configura-
tion together with the matter and acquire different and conflicting conclusions at
34 The term used by Aristotle for syllogistic figures in Greek is schema, which is indeed lexically very
close to the usual term for form, eidos.
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different times, are non-syllogistic and unreliable. (Alexander of Aphrodisias,
in Apr 52.20–24, translation p. 114)
Here is another passage which seems to attribute the validity of logical arguments
and operations in general to their form rather than to their matter:
For conversions – and in general deductions in the figures – do not depend,
as I have already said, on the peculiarities of the matter (which is different in
different cases), but on the nature of the figures themselves. That is why proofs
in their case are universal. (Alexander of Aphrodisiasin Apr 35.6–9, translation
p. 91).
A few centuries later, Ammonius is more cautious in his deployment of hylomorphic
concepts regarding arguments, speaking of analogy instead of outright identification:
In every syllogism there is something analogous to matter and something anal-
ogous to form. Analogous to matter are the objects (pragmata) themselves by
way of which the syllogism is combined, and analogous to form are the figures.
(Ammonius, in Apr 4.9–11, translation in Barnes 1990, 41).
Here, what seems to correspond to the matter of a syllogism are the things them-
selves, the objects named in the syllogism. Properly speaking, Ammonius is not saying
that the terms signifying these objects in the argument35 are (analogous to) the matter
of the argument, but rather that they signify (refer to, denote) this matter. But again it
is but a small step to view these very terms as constituting the matter of the argument.
Besides commentaries on the Prior Analytics, other important loci for the appli-
cation of the form versus matter framework to arguments were commentaries on the
Sophistical Refutations. Ebbesen (1981a, 95–105) narrates the story of the transmis-
sion of this tradition from later Greek sources to the medieval Latin tradition. Briefly
put, in the context of the doctrine of fallacies (which is the subject-matter of the
Sophistical Refutations), the issue of the different ways in which an argument can be
defective arises naturally. In effect, one of the divisions offered in the later ancient tra-
dition, and one which remained influential throughout the Latin Middle Ages, was that
between arguments that are formally defective and those that are materially defective.
Formally defective arguments would be those that do not display a valid (syllogis-
tic) mood, while materially defective arguments are those with false premises (thus
echoing Aristotle’s own remark that the premises are the matter to the conclusion).
Ebbesen (1981a, 97) adds that “the distinction between materially and formally defec-
tive arguments, though a stock item of the commentaries, never became an organic
part of the teaching of sophistic.” Nevertheless, these were certainly significant appli-
cations of the form versus matter distinction to arguments, in particular insofar as the
tradition seems to have passed on to the later Latin Middle Ages when the Sophisti-
cal Refutations and its commentaries were rediscovered in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries.
35 The medievals referred to these terms as categorematic terms, terms having a signification in them-
selves, while syncategorematic terms such as ‘is’, ‘every’, ‘no’ do not signify anything by themselves—a
distinction already noted by Aristotle in De Int. 16b24–25.
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In short, taking Aristotle’s mould analogy and his use of schematic letters in
syllogistic as their starting point, the Ancient Commentators formulated an account of
the form and matter of arguments that is clearly the first step towards LHAWKI. The
Commentators tend to speak of figures as corresponding to the forms of arguments,
but along the way between them and the Latin fourteenth century, the form of syllo-
gisms became increasingly associated to syllogistic moods; more generally, the form
of arguments became associated to schemata (syllogistic figures are not schemata in
the modern sense, but syllogistic moods are). In the only still extant twelfth century
Latin commentary on the Prior Analytics, dubbed Anonymus Aurelianensis III by
S. Ebbesen (fragments of which are edited in Ebbesen 1981b), the form of a syllogism
is said to be understood in two ways, following the typical medieval technique of
distinguishing different senses of the same term36:
Furthermore, the form of a syllogism is understood in two ways, namely the
disposition of the terms, which is called its figure, and the disposition of the
sentences, which is said to be its mood. (Latin in Ebbesen 1981b, 14, my trans-
lation)
And just as the form of syllogisms is understood in two ways, so is [their] matter
understood in two ways, namely terms and sentences. (Latin in Ebbesen 1981b,
15, my translation)
Whether the form of a syllogism corresponds to its figure or to its mood is a crucial
point, as the latter presupposes a partition of the vocabulary into two sorts, while the
former does not. In the form-as-figure case, we seem to have a notion of form as spatial
structure, as figures simply codify the relative position of the terms within the syllo-
gism; thus cast, the form versus matter opposition is not essentially mereological. In
the form-as-mood case, however, the form-matter distinction is clearly mereological;
the mood of a syllogism is also defined by the relative positions of its terms, to be
sure, but it is crucially determined by a certain subset of its vocabulary, namely words
such as ‘every’, ‘some’, ‘is’ and ‘not’. Hence, the view that the form of a syllogism
corresponds to its mood is already a (germinal) version of (mereological) LHAWKI,
minus the demarcational role attributed to the formal vocabulary.
Indeed—and this was the second step towards LHAWKI—in subsequent devel-
opments the view that the form of a syllogism (more generally, a particular subset
of an argument’s vocabulary) pertains to its mood became increasingly prevailing.
For reasons of space, I cannot spell out all the details of these developments, but the
crucial steps were: Boethius’ transmission of the gist of the Commentators’ logical
hylomorphism to the Latin world (but not of its terminology); Abelard’s distinction
between perfect and imperfect inferences, the former owing their validity to their
‘construction’ alone (again no use of explicit hylomorphical terminology); the Latin
rediscovery of the Aristotelian corpus (including the Physics and the Metaphysics)
and of the Ancient Commentators’ tradition in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries37;
36 Robert Kilwardby (see next footnote) makes a similar suggestion—see Thom (2007, 57).
37 An interesting aspect of this rediscovery was the tendency in thirteenth century Latin authors to pro-
ject Aristotelian metaphysics into logical analysis, something that Aristotle himself never did, and in fact
even going beyond the use of metaphysical concepts in logic that one finds in the Ancient Commentators.
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the consolidation of the notions of formal and material consequence in the fourteenth
century with Ockham, Buridan, Billingham and others. The crucial point is that, by
the fourteenth century, LHAWKI was already almost fully mature. At that point, the
notion of the form of an argument was not yet used for demarcational purposes, but the
idea of the form of an argument as pertaining to a particular subset of its vocabulary (in
a given disposition) was already fully developed, as can be perceived in the following
passages by the fourteenth century author John Buridan:
‘Formal’ consequence means that [the consequence] holds for all terms, retain-
ing the form common to all. Or, if you want to express it according to the proper
force of discourse, a formal consequence is that which, for every proposition
similar in form which might be formed, it would be a good consequence, such
as ‘some A is B; thus some B is A’.38 (Buridan 1976, 22/23 (5–9), my emphasis
and translation)
I say that, in the previous considerations (as we are speaking here of matter
and form), we understand by the ‘matter’ of the proposition or consequentia the
purely categorical terms, i.e. subjects and predicates, omitting the syncategore-
matic terms that enclose them and through which they are conjoined or negated
or distributed or forced to a certain mode of supposition. All the rest, we say,
pertains to the form. (Buridan 1976, 30 (7–12), my translation)
In other words, for Buridan the form of an argument pertains to its syncategor-
ematic terms in a certain disposition, while its matter pertains to its categorematic
terms. Buridan’s notion of formal consequence is thoroughly substitutional, but he
does not endorse a proto-form of LHAWKI because he does not view the validity of
formal consequences as grounded in their form (for an account of Buridan’s notion of
consequence, see Dutilh Novaes 2005).39 Nevertheless, there is a continuous historical
line from the Latin fourteenth century up to us, i.e. constant applications of the form
versus matter distinction to arguments resulting in a (strict) partition of the vocabulary
into terms belonging to form and terms belonging to matter. This general procedure
tended to receive bad publicity in the Renaissance and early modern period, but in
practice it continued to be used and applied. Via Leibniz and Kant, it made its way to
Bolzano, and then on to Tarski. In fact, the general idea of the form of an argument
as related to a subset of its terminology remained in the background throughout this
Footnote 37 continued
This trend is exemplified in particular by Robert Kilwardby—see Thom (2007). Here is an important pas-
sage for our purposes from Kilwardby’s commentary on the Prior Analytics: “A syllogism, since it is a
certain composite, ought to be composed of matter and form. Hence, if it is deficient in either, it will not
be a syllogism” (quoted in Thom 2007, 47, his translation). Kilwardby clearly felt that it was important to
justify why it makes sense to speak of the form and matter of a syllogism.
38 The Latin text as transcribed by Hubien actually has the following: “what is A is B, therefore what is B
is A” (“quod est A est B; ergo quod est B est A”), which is obviously an invalid consequence-schema. This
is indeed what one usually finds in the available manuscripts of the text, but it is probably a scribal error
from an earlier manuscript (it is unlikely that Buridan himself would have made such a blunt mistake).
39 Moreover, Buridan acknowledges that the categorematic versus syncategorematic partition of the vocab-
ulary is not a straightforward, clear-cut matter. For example, he recognizes the existence of ‘limit cases’,
such as the verbs ‘to see’, ‘to want’, ‘to know’, which perform functions relevant to both the form and the
matter of a sentence. See Buridan (2001, 4.3.8.4).
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period. Hence, it seems evident that the tradition discussed in Sect. 1 above is fully
embedded in the historical developments just described here.
The last crucial step towards LHAWKI as characterized in Sect. 1 takes place with
Kant: he is the first to have attempted to demarcate logic by means of its formal-
ity. Even though Kant himself did not rely on the substitutional-schematic notion of
‘formal’ for demarcational purposes, this is precisely what most of the subsequent
tradition attempted to do, meshing the mereological hylomorphism as applied to argu-
ments that had been available at least since the Latin Middle Ages with the Kantian
demarcating enterprise.40 It is precisely this combination that gave birth to LHAWKI,
and in particular to the problem of demarcating logical constants. I shall not review
the historical details of the Kantian demarcational enterprise and the extent to which it
still seems to underpin many of the currently widespread views on logic, as all this is
aptly described in (MacFarlane 2000). For my purposes here, it is sufficient to stress
that, in developments prior to Kant, the concern with demarcating logic from other
disciplines was virtually absent, and that the scope of the themes and topics treated
under the heading of logic was quite broad. (Just to illustrate the point, notice that
Buridan distinguishes formal from material consequences by means of a substitutivity
criterion, but he does not ban material consequences from the realm of logic.)
3 Reassessing logical hylomorphism
We now tend to assume that applying the form versus matter distinction to arguments in
particular and to logic in general is a perfectly reasonable, natural thing to do; in fact, it
would be difficult for most of us even to conceive the nature of logic in any other terms.
In other words, we take the application of this distinction to logic for granted—we take
logical hylomorphism for granted. But as the overview of the history of applications of
this distinction to logic in Sect. 2 suggests, there are good historical reasons not to take
logical hylomorphism for granted, as each step towards the development of LHAWKI
involved substantive assumptions. There are also systematic, conceptual reasons:
• Are arguments the kind of things it makes sense to speak of in hylomorphic terms?
For Aristotle, typically the concepts of form and matter are applied to substances,
i.e. to wholes but not to heaps. But are arguments wholes or heaps? They are
clearly not substances as an individual man or any of the items to which the form
versus matter distinction is typically applied by Aristotle. This does not mean that
applications of the distinction to arguments are automatically unwarranted, but it
does seem that a justification would be required to ground these applications of
hylomorphism to such ‘unusual’ objects such as arguments.41
• Are we justified in importing presuppositions and expectations pertaining to
metaphysical hylomorphism into logical hylomorphism? Within metaphysical
40 I am not entirely sure as to when, after Kant, the Kantian demarcational project enlisted the age-old
distinction between the form and the matter of an argument based on a partition of the vocabulary for its
demarcating purposes.
41 An answer to this question would require an analysis of the metaphysics of arguments. What are argu-
ments made of? Are they artifacts crafted by people for certain purposes, just as hammers and toothbrushes?
Or do they have some sort of independent existence?
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hylomorphism, there is the presupposition of a sharp, factual distinction/demarca-
tion between the form and the matter of a thing, as these two aspects of a thing are
seen as being of different ontological kinds. Moreover, there is usually (though
not always) the presupposition of uniqueness of form for each thing. We have
seen that LHAWKI relies on the assumption of uniqueness of form and of a prin-
cipled separation of form from matter. If it makes sense at all to apply the form
versus matter distinction to arguments, should it come accompanied by these typi-
cally metaphysical presuppositions? (Notice however that within LHAWKI these
assumptions are related to specific theses tacitly or explicitly held about logic, and
are thus not only projections imported from the metaphysical context.)
• Should the separation between the form and the matter of arguments be used to
demarcate the realm of logic? Does it make sense to define the scope and nature
of logic exclusively in terms of a particular class of terms/notions? It is as if ‘the
class of logical notions’ were a natural kind, having something like a Platonic
independent existence and defining ‘from above’ the scope and nature of logic.
The form versus matter partition would be an ontic matter, previously settled, and
our task as logicians and philosophers of logic would be that of discovering the
exact boundaries of this pre-existing natural kind. As such, these views clearly
entail a strong form of Platonism about logic, which seems a rather costly position
to hold.
These are issues that proponents of logical hylomorphism as a demarcating crite-
rion, in particular related to the schematic notion of the formal and to the idea of a
privileged class of logical constants, must address in order to provide a philosophically
solid basis for LHAWKI. For the moment, none of them seems to have been properly
tackled, and the extreme difficulty in establishing a principled criterion defining the
class of logical notions/logical constants suggests that there is no such thing as the
natural kind ‘logical constants’—or else that, even if there is such a class, we humans
are not cognitively well equipped to discover its boundaries.
It might be objected (as has been objected by an anonymous referee) that contem-
porary philosophers and logicians are not likely to recognize themselves and many of
their views as ultimately stemming from the Aristotelian and Kantian concepts and
concerns described in Sect. 2. That is probably true, but this is at least to some extent
related to an insufficient knowledge of the history of their discipline.42 More impor-
tantly, it might be thought that, even if there is some murky, remote historical connec-
tion, it is by now too frail to be of philosophical interest. Now, the point of the present
contribution is to invite these contemporary philosophers and logicians to reflect on
and reassess the tacit assumptions underlying many of their views about logic, and
it seems to me that paying attention to the historical development of these assump-
tions is a fruitful reflection-trigger. I believe that the connections that emerge between
the ‘textbook’ view discussed in Sect. 1 and the historical developments discussed in
Sect. 2 speak for themselves. More generally, the need for a broad re-evaluation of
42 MacFarlane (2000) has done a great job at showing how deeply (and usually unwittingly) influenced by
the Kantian conception of logic we still are. Admittedly, the connection with the Ancient Commentators
on Aristotle is more remote and would deserve a more thorough examination than what I provide here, but
at the very least the present analysis suggests that it is a hypothesis worth taking into account.
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the assumptions underpinning logical hylomorphism as we know it is evident, and a
deeper knowledge of the history of the distinction with respect to logic seems like an
appropriate approach (albeit of course not the only one) for this end.
So here is one possible diagnose of the situation: uses of the substitutional-schematic
technique to formulate accounts of the very grounds for the validity of arguments and
of the scope of logic rest on the mistake of confusing a particular method used in
logic with its very subject-matter.43 The quasi-metaphysical question of the ultimate
grounds for argument validity simply cannot be resolved by an appeal to the method
of working with schemata; this method has been extensively used since Aristotle as
a means to capture interesting patterns among valid arguments, but not (or rarely) as
an explanation for the very phenomenon of argument validity.44 The substitutional
technique of allowing for some terms to remain fixed while others are replaced by
schematic letters, yielding schemata, pertains to the practice of logic; the quest for
that in virtue of which valid arguments are valid pertains to the philosophy of logic.
Of course, there is no reason why these two must be strictly kept apart: the practice
of logic can certainly benefit from philosophical insights, and the philosophy of logic
should deal for as much as possible with the actual practices of logicians. Nevertheless,
the questions being asked in each domain are of a different nature: the logician wants
tools that allow her to study systematically the (logical) properties of valid arguments;
the philosopher of logic raises questions such as “what is logic?”, “what makes a valid
argument valid?” etc.
My proposal is thus not to get rid of the schematic-substitutional technique—it has
been crucial for much of the progress made in logic so far, and it still seems to have
much to deliver—but rather to give up on the idea that this technique by itself can
resolve deeper philosophical issues such as the demarcation of logic. If logic as a dis-
cipline can be demarcated at all, it seems that this cannot be done by simply isolating
a particular subset of notions or concepts as quintessentially logical by means of a
(sharp, principled) partition of the vocabulary. This being said, I surely do not wish to
imply that philosophical questions such as the grounds for the validity of arguments
and the nature of logic should be dropped altogether. But these questions must be
addressed in their own terms, i.e. philosophical terms.
43 I guess this claim really makes me be a Debunker in MacFarlane’s sense (2009, Sect. 8): “They do not
dispute that logicians have traditionally concerned themselves with argument forms in which a limited num-
ber of expressions occur essentially. What they deny is that these expressions and argument forms define
the subject matter of logic. On their view, logic is concerned with validity simpliciter, not just validity that
holds in virtue of a limited set of “logical forms.” The logician’s method for studying validity is to classify
arguments by their forms, but these forms (and the logical constants that in part define them) are logic’s
tools, not its subject matter.”
44 One of the few pre-twentieth century, worked-out accounts of the validity of some arguments in terms of
their construction is Abelard’s discussion of the validity of perfect inferences in the Dialectica. This being
said, Abelard does not claim that imperfect inferences are not valid: rather, they are valid, but their validity
rests on ‘the nature of things’. Aristotle himself offers a very general definition of a valid argument, in terms
of the conclusion following ‘of necessity’ from the premises—see Prior Analytics, 24b19–24.
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So here are some of the plausible positions one could hold on the relation between
hylomorphism and logic45:
• The application of hylomorphism to logic is infelicitous; arguments and other log-
ical objects are simply not the kind of things having ‘form’ and ‘matter’. Applying
the distinction to logic entails the risk of an undue projection of expectations and
presuppositions (such as that there is a sharp, factual distinction between form
and matter and that there is one unique form for each thing) that only distorts our
understanding of logic. This position amounts to a rejection of all of the eight
theses formulated in Sect. 1 as characterizing LHAWKI.
• (Mereological) hylomorphism can be applied to logic, but only as a metaphor that
should not be pushed over its limits; as well said by Ammonius, in an argument
there is something analogous to form and something analogous to matter. If it
is but an analogy, then there is no need to establish a principled, sharp demarca-
tion between the form and the matter of logical objects, as this can be a matter
of pragmatic choice given the circumstances. It would seem that this metaphor-
ical/analogical form of logical hylomorphism was the one actually endorsed by
logicians and philosophers in most of its history, certainly up until demarcational
concerns came into the picture with Kant. In particular, it served as support for the
development of the schematic-substitutional technique that was decisive for the
development of logic as a discipline. (But notice that Aristotle himself uses this
technique in the Prior Analytics, in particular in order to prove the invalidity of
some syllogistic moods, so the technique itself predates logical hylomorphism.)
This position amounts to a rejection of some of the eight theses formulated in
Sect. 1 as characterizing LHAWKI, in particular thesis 4 and thesis 8 (possibly 7
as well).
• This particular form of mereological logical hylomorphism does not work, but
perhaps a different understanding of hylomorphism may provide a more illu-
minating account of logic from a hylomorphic perspective. In particular, the
non-mereological, functionalist hylomorphism that emerges from Aristotle’s own
writings may provide a fruitful framework to think about logic in hylomorphic
terms. On a functionalist approach to hylomorphism, form corresponds to a func-
tional principle of unity, i.e. that in virtue of which the object in question fulfils the
function(s) that characterize(s) it as an object. This position amounts to a rejection
of many of the eight theses formulated in Sect. 1 as characterizing LHAWKI, but
an endorsement of theses 1, 4 and 5.
On a functionalist approach to logic, the first question to be asked is: What is the
function of a valid argument? What is it that differentiates a valid from an invalid
argument? A functionalist approach to logic may shift the focus away from the issue
of a partition of the vocabulary into logical and non-logical expressions in favor of
an analysis of deeper issues; arguably, LHAWKI severely misidentifies the real core
of the phenomenon of argument validity. Of course, thus formulated, a functionalist
45 I do not discuss here the Kantian blend of logical hylomorphism, according to which logic deals with
the pure forms of the understanding, as a proper analysis of this position would require a significant amount
of space. Suffice it to say that I believe it to be equally problematic, albeit for different reasons.
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approach to logic is not a framework that delivers all the answers, but it may be a
framework that allows for the formulation of the right questions.
At any rate, what the present analysis suggests is that the particular form of logical
hylomorphism that we seem to take for granted as the only natural one, LHAWKI, is
just one possible, and in fact a rather dubious, outcome of the combination of hylomor-
phism and logic. There are other options available: outright rejection of the explanatory
power of the hylomorphic framework when it comes to logic; an analogical, metaphor-
ical application of the notions of form and matter to logical objects, with no further
theoretical commitments or projections; taking a different notion of hylomorphism as
a starting point for the development of a logical hylomorphism. (There may be other
options as well, I do not claim to be exhaustive here.) These three options all seem
to avoid some of the traps that LHAWKI finds itself struggling with, in particular the
issue of demarcating in a sharp, principled manner the class of logical constants as a
means to define the very scope and nature of logic. It is the endorsement of all eight
of the theses formulated in Sect. 1 that seems to lead to such issues. This being said,
I am not claiming that LHAWKI cannot be salvaged; perhaps it can, but this would
require that the issues raised throughout the paper be properly addressed. So it seems
to me that the ball is now on the court of the advocates of LHAWKI.
4 Conclusion
The historical goal of the paper was to unearth the historical roots of LHAWKI. In par-
ticular, I have argued that the main steps of these developments were: the application
of the form versus matter distinction to arguments with the Ancient Commentators; the
association of the schemata underlying arguments to their form in later developments
(in particular in the Latin Middle Ages); the co-opting of the notion of form in logic
for demarcational purposes with and after Kant.
However, the main aim of the paper was systematic, namely that of reflecting on
the propriety of applying the form versus matter distinction to logical objects such
as arguments, and to logic in general. The conclusion to be drawn is that the par-
ticular form of logical hylomorphism that appears to be widely but tacitly endorsed,
LHAWKI, is not nearly as innocent and straightforward as most of us seem to think.
It is based on substantive and often contentious assumptions; it fails to address some
important foundational issues (e.g. are logical objects the kind of objects having form
and matter?); and it yields thorny issues that seem to arise from undue conceptual
projections (in particular the issue of demarcating the class of logical constants in a
sharp, principled way). With this paper, I hope to provide further arguments supporting
the search for an alternative philosophical account of logic, one where the usual issues
that emerge within LHAWKI may be avoided. In particular, I have argued that a shift
of focus away from the issue of demarcating the logical from the non-logical may be
beneficial for our understanding of logic in general; it seems that worrying about the
borders makes us lose sight of the core.
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